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Intervention by Nondiverse Parties
in Sptuious Class Actions
The requirement of complete diversity among opposing
parties to an action has not been applied to intervention
in spurious class actions although it has been applied in
such similar areas as permissive intervention in nonclass
actions and permissive joinder. This result is commonly
justified on the ground that the spurious class action is
merely a device to circumvent the complete diversity re-
quirement. The author of this Note rejects this justifica-
tion and re-examines the problem of intervention. He con-
cludes that such intervention may be justifiable on in-
dependent grounds.
INTRODUCTION
The statutory grant of federal diversity jurisdiction was early in-
terpreted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss'
to require complete diversity between all opposing parties with a
joint interest in an action. Although the Supreme Court itself soon
expressed dissatisfaction with this requirement, - it still exists as a
limitation on diversity jurisdiction.' The present application of
this requirement to the procedural devices of joinder, intervention,
and class actions presents an anomalous situation.
Courts will apply the rule of complete diversity to joinder situ-
ations-for example, where A and B, citizens of Minnesota, and
C, a citizen of Wisconsin, wish to join in an action against D, a
citizen of Wisconsin. Where joinder is permissive under Rule 20,
1. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
2. See Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555(1844).
3. The holding in Stravbridge does not appear to be a constitutional
limitation. See Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 876 (5th Cir. 1957); 3
MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 22.09[1], at 3029 (2d ed. 1948); Develop-
ments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 874, 919 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. This is par-
ticularly true with spurious class actions since the rights involved are
several, not joint.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
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courts will refuse to allow C to be joined in the action.' Whel\
joinder is necessary under Rule 19,1 courts distinguish betweein
indispensable and conditionally necessary parties.7 If C is an in-
dispensable party, the court will require that he be joined even
though the lack of complete diversity will divest the court of juris-
diction over the entire action;' if C is only a conditionally neces-
sary party, his joinder is not required, and the court may dismiss
him, but retain jurisdiction over the rest of the action. Similarly,
if instead of joining initially in the action, C seeks permission to in-
tervene" in the action brought by A and B, courts will also apply
the rule of complete diversity and deny the intervention.1 But if
A and B are able to bring their suit as a spurious class action"
on their own behalf as well as on behalf of others similarly situ-
ated, most courts will allow C to intervene despite his lack of
diversity. 3
One commonly asserted explanation of this anomaly is that the
spurious class action is intended to enable parties to circumvent
the complete diversity requirement of permissive joinder. 4 Such
5. Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570, 579 (1873); Weaver v.
Marcus, 165 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1948); Developments 893.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 9.
7. An indispensable party is one who has "an interest of such a nature
that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest,
or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Shields v.
Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1855). A conditionally necessary
party is one whose interest is "separable from those of the parties before
the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete
and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court
. ... "Ibid.
8. See Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947).
9. See Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952); FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(b).
10. See FED. R. CIv. P. 24(b)(2).
11. See Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954);
Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243 (E.D.
Ky. 1942); Developments 905-06. But see Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D.
9 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Intervention of right, however, is allowed without regard
to the citizenship of the intervenor. See, e.g., Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d
666 (5th Cir. 1957).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
13. See, e.g., Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12 (10th Cir. 1956), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 600 (1958); P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. New-
man, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R.,
70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.12,
at 3474 (2d ed. 1948). But see Wagner v. Kemper, 13 F.R.D. 128, 130
(W.D. Mo. 1952).
14. This view was advanced in the ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVE-
LAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES 264 (1938), and fully explained in
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11[3] (2d ed. 1948). Many courts have
adopted this view, often citing Moore as authority. See, e.g., California
a use of the spurious class action, however, has been criticized as
"at once irrelevant to the purpose of the class suit, trivial, and
probably unsound."'5 The function of this Note is to re-examine
the justification for the relaxation of the normal jurisdic-
tional requirements for intervention in the spurious class suit."6
Such an examination requires an analysis both of the application of
res judicata to class suits and of the nature and function of the
spurious class suit.
I. RES JUDICATA IN CLASS SUITS
A. THE DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
The res judicata effect of a judgment in a class action bears on
the problem of intervention by nondiverse parties through the op-
eration of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. According to this
doctrine, the court is held to acquire jurisdiction over a case or
controversy as a whole.' If a court has jurisdiction over the
main action, the failure of an intervenor to meet the diversity re-
quirement will be ignored to the extent that his claim is ancillary
or subordinate to the main action.' Jurisdiction over the non-
diverse party is justified on the ground that it is necessary to en-
able the court to make the judgment in the main action effective.' 9
Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., 162 F.2d 893, 897 (2d Cir. 1947);
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945); Weeks v.
Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88 n.5 (7th Cir. 1941); Kaeppler v. James
H. Matthews & Co., 180 F. Supp. 691, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Zachman
v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1959); D & A Motors, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 19 F.R.D. 365, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
15. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHL L. REV. 684, 704 (1941). See Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962), where the court con-
cedes that the spurious class suit does permit circumvention of the com-
plete diversity requirement, but declared:
[W]e envisage it as having a broader purpose-to allow a final de-
termination of common questions of law and fact. Otherwise 23(a)(3) is relegated to an out-of-context incongruity amongst the utilitarian
procedural modes which, .when brought together, elucidate the modem-
day concept of class actions.
16. This Note will deal solely with the problems raised by plaintiff classes
for those raised by defendant classes involve different policies and considera-
tions. For example, the nature and function of the spurious class suit as
an effective group remedy is not a consideration with a defendant class.
See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 696 n.39.
17. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
18. Developments 894 n.137. Another application of ancillary jurisdic-
tion is in regard to compulsory counterclaims. A court will allow a compul-
sory counterclaim to be interposed even if it is not supported by independent
jurisdictional grounds. See Green, Federal Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims,
48 Nw. U.L. REV. 271, 282 (1953).
19. See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955).
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Also, allowing such jurisdiction eliminates trying actions in a
piecemeal fashion.2"
Since the effect of the judgment determines whether interven-
tion by nondiverse parties will be allowed under the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction in true 1 and hybrid class actions, 22 the ef-
fect of the judgment in a spurious class action may also determine
whether intervention 23 in that action by nondiverse parties is jus-
tifiable under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
B. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
At present, courts have taken a "categorical approach" when
faced with problems of res judicata in class actions24 and have
20. Ancillary jurisdiction has been termed "one of the most useful de-
vices for mitigating the otherwise strict limitations of federal jurisdiction."
BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RULES ED-
ITION § 23, at 93 (rev. ed. Wright 1960). It "exists because without it the
court could neither effectively dispose of the principal case nor do complete
justice in the premises. It is a common-sense solution of the problems of
piecemeal litigation which otherwise would arise by virtue of the limited
jurisdiction of federal courts." Id. at 94. See HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 929 (1953).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(2).
Permissive intervention by nondiverse parties is generally allowed in true
and hybrid class suits. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356 (1921); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885). Similarly, inter-
vention of right by nondiverse parties is allowed in nonclass actions. See,
e.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Hartley Pen Co. v.
Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 147 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
Fairness would seem to require a court to allow an absent party to
intervene if he will be bound by the judgment. See Developments 942.
"[I]t is helpful to remember that the reason for relaxing the requirement
of independent grounds of jurisdiction [is] . . . the need for the court to
be unhampered in its right to protect outsiders from injury through the
exercise of its processes." Campbell, Jurisdiction and Venue Aspects of
Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 7 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1940).
23. This problem of intervention by nondiverse parties is magnified by
the fact that in a class action almost all cases will involve permissive inter-
vention. Whether intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2), for which
independent jurisdictional grounds are not required, is available to inter-
venors in class actions is doubtful. Rule 24(a)(2) requires both that a party
be inadequately represented and bound by the judgment before he has a
right to intervene. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the Supreme
Court said that a judgment in a class action is not binding upon absent
members unless they are adequately represented in the class suit. See
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327,
337-39 (1948); Developments 941; cf. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
24. The first draft of Rule 23(a) defined the res judicata effect to be
given a judgment in a class action. This effect differed acc-rding to wheth-
er the action was true, hybrid, or spurious. See Moore, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937). This proposal was rejected as too substantive
NOTES
established the following principles: "A judgment in a 'true' class
action is conclusive on absent members; in a 'hybrid' action, as to
their fights in the res; in a 'spurious' action, only on parties
before the courL." The rule that a judgment in a true class ac-
tion binds all members of the class is weU established in equity
procedure.16 This rule is necessary to insure the efficacy of the
true class suit as a solution to the problem of compulsory joinder
where it is impractical to bring all indispensable parties before the
court.2" The necessity for the binding effect of a judgment in a
true class action revealed the impropriety of the provision in
Equity Rule 48 that in class suits "the decree shall be without preju-
dice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties";2 conse-
quently, this limitation was omitted when Equity Rule 38 replac-
ed Equity Rule 48 in 1912.29 The Supreme Court soon declared
that a judgment in a true class suit binds those parties not before
the court if they are properly represented.' In a hybrid class
action, the judgment binds absent members to the extent of their
claim in specific property.3 Thus, since the judgment in a true
or a hybrid class action is binding on absent members, intervention
by nondiverse parties is justified under the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction.3"
for a procedural rule. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdic-
tion and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 555, 556 (1938). Professor
Moore, however, adopted this proposal in his treatise to explain the effect
of a judgment in a class action. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.11
(2d ed. 1948).
25. Note, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 824 (1946); accord, Knowles v. War
Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
26. See 1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcTIcE § 549 (1909).
27. Id. §§ 550-52.
28. Equity R. 48, 210 U.S. 524 (1907); see HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY
RULES 105 (8th ed. 1912). The courts tended to disregard this provision.
See, e.g., Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' Unions, 90 Fed. 598 (N.D. Ohio
1898).
29. Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912); see HOPKINS, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 239-42.
30. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). The
Court in that case reasoned that according to the holding in Stewart v.
Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885), there would have been ancillary jurisdiction
over the absent members if they had intervened in the first class action;
consequently, the decree in that action was binding on the rights of every
member of the class. See DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 177, at 687
(1928).
31. This is exemplified by a creditors' bill to force a corporation into
receivership. If a new corporation is formed to buy up the remaining as-
sets, all creditors with notice are bound by the receivership proceedings.
See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised
by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 574 (1937).
32. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 364-67
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Consistent with this categorical approach, courts have generally
followed the rule that a judgment in a spurious class action is not
binding upon the absent members of the class." Consequently,
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction will not justify intervention
by nondiverse parties in spurious class actions on the basis of the
res judicata effect of the judgment; such intervention can only
be justified in terms of the nature and function of the spurious
class suit.
This use of a categorical approach to res judicata in class ac-
tions, however, is unsatisfactory for several reasons. The difficulty
courts have had in classifying suits as either true, hybrid, or spuri-
ous would seem to make the differences in these three types of
class suits, as defined by Rule 23,11 of questionable value in de-
termining the application of res judicata to judgments in class
actions." In one case, after a class action had been characterized
as hybrid by one court and spurious by another, the Third Circuit
gave up and simply declared that "names are not important. ' '30
In addition, the terms joint, common, and several, which are
used to differentiate the types of class actions in Rule 23, have
acquired meanings in dissimilar contexts that courts have car-
ried over into the area of class suits." Also, the determination
under a categorical approach that a judgment in a spurious class
action is not binding on absent members of the class seems irre-
concilable with the requirement of adequate representation in Rule
23 (a) since this requirement is applicable to all three class suits.
The same possibility of inadequate representation would seem to
exist regardless of the type of class suit involved. 8 In any class
(1921); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885); Boesenberg v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942).
33. See Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38, rehearing
denied, 208 U.S. 609 (1908); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11, at
3465 (2d ed. 1948); 1 STREET, op. cit. supra note 26, § 552, at 345.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
35. Developments 931. But see VanDercreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 48 IOWA L. REv. 273, 283 (1963),
where the author proposes a "simple test" to distinguish a true from a spuri-
ous class action: where joinder would be required if the suit were not
brought as a class action, it is a true class action; otherwise, it is a spuri-
ous class action.
36. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Deck-
ert, 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941), reversing sub nom. Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941), on remand
from 311 U.S. 282 (1940), reversing 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), reversing
27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939). Compare Pentland v. Dravo Corp.. 152
F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945), with Sexton v. W. S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp.
519, 521 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
37. CIAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950); Develop-
ments 931.
38. See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 23, at 333.
NOTES
suit, the absent members would seem to run the risk of poor
counsel or that the interests of those in court are in some way in-
consistent with their own interests.
C. AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH
These problems arising from the "ineptitudes of categoriza-
tion"39 might be avoided if courts would abandon their categori-
cal approach and determine the binding effect of judgments in
class suits on the basis of such factors as the relationship of the
parties,40 the protection of absent members of the class, and ju-
dicial economy. If the parties have some extra-legal relationship,
such as being from the same town, school, athletic team, or club,
there may be more justification for treating them as bound by the
judgment than if they are merely litigating a "common question of
law or fact." However, even if the relationship between the par-
ties is tenuous, it should be considered in the light of other tenuous
relationships that are regarded as sufficient for a binding judg-
ment. Thus, in a large tort action arising from a plane accident, the
relationship between individuals who bought tickets on the same
plane is no more tenuous than the relationship between individuals
who buy an insurance policy from a fraternal benefit society. 2
Buying such a policy in no way indicates a greater desire to be
treated or thought of as a class than buying a plane or train tic-
ket.43
The protection of absent members that courts should consider
include the feasibility of giving them adequate notice' and the
39. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REv.
905, 945 (1962).
40. See Developments 937.
41. Id. at 936.
42. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921),
where some 70,000 members of the fraternal benefit society constituted a
"true" class and were bound by the judgment in an action brought by
523 members of the class. Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 23, at 337.
43. After the accident, moreover, the parties, either through their own
actions or through those of their attorneys, may indicate a desire to be
treated as a class. For example, some may join together to hire one at-
torney; they may initiate joint discovery procedures; or their attorneys
may cooperate with regard to the whole case.
44. Rule 23 could provide for giving notice to absent parties. In fact,
the Advisory Committee for the Rules on Civil Procedure made such a
suggestion. They proposed that the court "may order that notice be given
... including notice to absent persons that they may come in and
present claims and defenses if they so desire." 3A BARRON & HOLT-
ZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RULES EDITION 551 (rev. ed.
Wright 1958); see Simeone, supra note 39, at 957-58; cf. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). A similar ap-
proach was taken with interpleader. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
1963]
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adequacy of the representation of their interests. 45 The latter in-
quiry entails specifically examining the various interests of all
members of the class to ensure that those litigating have interests
that are "co-extensive with and not antagonistic to"40 the interests
of those members not in court.4" Before a court decides to make
the judgment binding on absent members, it should also consider
the judicial economy of settling similar claims in a single action,
the possibility that the absent members' claims could be settled
out of court, and the number of subsidiary claims that may have
to be litigated individually.48
If courts would adopt this empirical approach to the binding
effect of judgments in class actions, they could make judgments
in spurious class actions binding on absent members.49 De-
spite the fact that the members of a spurious class are bound to-
gether only by a common question of law or fact, the judgment in
a spurious class action could be res judicata on all members and
not be unconstitutional. A significant aspect of the decision in
Hansberry v. Lee5" was the Court's indication that if rights of
absent parties are in fact adequately represented and adequate
notice is given, a judgment in a spurious class action could consti-
tutionally be made binding on absent members of the class.5 ' The
45. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-45 (1940); Knowles v. War
Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Arguably, the decision in
Hansberry casts some doubt on the validity of the body of res judicata
law predicated on the principles announced in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), where a judgment was made binding al-
though there was no showing of notice to absent members nor was there
any inquiry as to whether they acquiesced in the interests of those actually
in court. Cf. Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 23, at 337; Simeone,
supra note 39, at 947.
46. Developments 938.
47. Although this might present an administrative problem with a large
class, such an inquiry seems to be constitutionally required regardless of
the type of class suit involved. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
48. Developments 936-39.
49. Ci. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 257-58.
50. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
51.
Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to say that,
when the only circumstance defining the class is that the determina-
tion of the rights of its members turns upon a single issue of fact or law,
a state could not constitutionally adopt a procedure whereby some of
the members of the class could stand in judgment for all, provided
that the procedure were so devised and applied as to insure that those
present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation
is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the
common issue.
Id. at 43.
Generally courts have declined to accept the invitation advanced by
the dictum in Hansberry v. Lee. See All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Eldred, 209
612
extension of res judicata to spurious class actions is also supported
by such policy considerations as economy of litigation and sympa-
thy for the position of the opposing party.
Under the categorical approach, the judgment in a spurious class
action is not binding on absent parties and thus precludes opera-
tion of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to justify intervention
by nondiverse members of the spurious class, but this categorical
approach is unsatisfactory for many reasons. If courts were to use
an empirical approach and make judgments in many spurious
class actions binding on absent members of the class, the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction could then be used to justify intervention
by nondiverse parties.
II. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE
SPURIOUS CLASS ACTION
A. As A GROUP REMEDY
Whether courts continue to use a categorical approach or adopt
an empirical approach to res judicata, intervention by nondiverse
parties may be justified in terms of the function served by the
spurious class action. The major importance of the spurious class
action is that it serves as an effective group remedy. Since indus-
trial, commercial, and technological changes in modem society
increase the frequency of group injuries, plaintiffs need a procedu-
ral device that will enable them to assert their rights as a group. "3
From the standpoint of judicial economy, such a group remedy
is desirable.5" Occasions appropriate for the use of the spurious
class suit as a group remedy include actions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,55 treble damage suits under the antitrust laws,58
race relations litigation,57 major air and rail disaster litigation,
and fraudulent activities injuring numerous individuals.' In many
F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954); Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942); Hunter v. Southern Indcm. Under-
writers, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 244 (E.D. Ky. 1942). See Keeffe, Levy &
Donovan, supra note 23, at 342; Simeone, supra note 39, at 953-56;
Note, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 818, 833 (1946).
52. See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 23, at 343: Simeone,
supra note 39, at 953-56; VanDercreek, supra note 35, at 287-89.
53. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 686; Simeone, supra
note 39, at 906.
54. Ibid.
55. See, e.g., Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).
56. See, e.g., P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 25 F.R.D.
264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
57. See, e.g., Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir.
1962). See generally Note, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 991 (1956).
58. See, e.g., Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank, 281 N.Y.
1963] NOTES 613
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of these areas, the existence of constitutional and statutory rights
indicates a public policy encouraging the enforcement of these
rights. 9 These cases often involve complex facts and intricate
law and the types of injuries that affect the interests of many peo-
ple.60 Moreover, redress for such injuries may involve expenses
that are totally disproportionate to any of the individual claims.61
Consequently, most of the class suits that are "socially important"
are spurious class actions. 6' These reasons underscore the need
to provide plaintiffs with effective procedural means of securing
redress.
The spurious class action is effective as a group remedy for
several reasons. It constitutes an invitation to individuals in simi-
lar positions to join in the action. 3 It enables persons with small
claims who otherwise could not afford to bring suit to secure relief
because they can share the expenses with other parties or substan-
tially mitigate expenses by taking advantage of a favorable de-
cree.64 In addition, such a suit offers an economic advantage be-
cause a plaintiff who initiates the suit can offer a potential fee
based on the recovery in the class suit and can thereby obtain
more competent counsel than if he brought the suit for himself.",
Although the spurious class suit and permissive joinder under
Rule 2066 are similar in operation, the spurious class suit func-
tions better as a group remedy. The need for a group remedy
exists most often where individuals actively wish to enforce their
rights rather than when they are passively brought into court.
282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276
N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937); Simeone, supra note 39, at 960.
59. Cf. Note, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 991 (1956).
60. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 684.
61. Id. at 684-85.
62. Id. at 698-99; see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954).
63. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 688; accord, All Am.
Airways, Inc. v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954).
64. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 686-88.
65. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 435 (1960), which also enumerates a
psychological advantage in that a person is part of a group, and a proce-
dural advantage in that "there may be greater control of other lawyers
seeking to assert related rights so that rational tactics in prosecuting the
suit are made possible." In areas where federal policy favors enforcement
of rights, such as in the school segregation cases, the use of a spurious
class suit eliminates the possibility that the situation of a single plaintiff
may change and thereby render the issue "moot," thus avoiding the likeli-
hood of dismissal or compromise. See McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed,"
A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991, 1085 (1956);
cf. Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Tex. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1956).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
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Since, by definition, more individuals are involved in class ac-
tions than in permissive joinder situations, there will be more peo-
ple to defer the cost of litigation and to contribute and assist in
gathering knowledge. To the extent that intervention after the de-
termination of liability is possible, 7 the spurious class suit pre-
serves the benefits of a favorable decision for those who have
not intervened in the action. Moreover, if courts adopt an empiri-
cal approach to res judicata, the spurious class action can be made
even more effective since the knowledge that a decree can bind
an absent member of the class is likely to be more of an "affirma-
tive technique for bringing everyone into the case and for making
recovery available to all. It is not so much a matter of permitting
joinder as of ensuring it."' 8
B. As A JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION BY NONDIVERSE
PARTIES
The function of the spurious class suit as a group remedy thus
justifies intervention by nondiverse parties and may also explain
why complete diversity is still required for permissive joinder. If
the nondiverse members of the class are denied intervention, they
are denied the benefits of a favorable judgment and the effective-
ness of the group remedy is thereby impaired. 9 If such members
wish to assert their rights, they must instigate a new action and
will benefit from the judgment in the spurious class action only
as it constitutes favorable precedent.
The importance of intervention as a means of ensuring the ef-
fectiveness of the spurious class action as a group remedy, how-
ever, must be balanced against the resulting expansion of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction through the relaxation of the complete
diversity requirement. Since the present statutory provision for di-
versity jurisdiction is itself often criticized," any expansion of
67. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561
(10th Cir. 1962). This case involved a spurious class action brought by
certain miners on behalf of other miners to recover damages for injuries
arising from defendants' violations of the Sherman Act. The jury returned
separate verdicts for the named plaintiffs and for the unnamed miners.
The trial court then allowed these miners six months to appear and file
their claims for damages. This procedure was affirmed by the circuit court
because it viewed the spurious class action as intended "to allow a final
determination of common questions of law and fact." Id. at 589; see Sime-
one, supra note 39, at 956-57.
68. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 688.
69. See id. at 695; Note, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 991, 1009 (1956).
70. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928); Doub, Time
for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?, 44 A.B.A.J.
243 (1958). But see Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts,
1963]
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such jurisdiction will be closely scrutinized by the courts.' In fact,
allowing intervention by nondiverse parties is not a great expansion
of diversity jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court is established
when diverse parties initiate their action; the only expansion is in
the number of parties asserting claims.7"
The justification for intervention by nondiverse parties in
spurious class actions in terms of the function that suit is intended
to serve must also meet a more fundamental objection-why
must that action be brought in the federal court to serve as an ef-
fective group remedy? While conceivably a spurious class action
could be as effective in a state court, the federal court seems su-
perior for practical reasons. First, not all states provide for such
a procedural device.73 Second, federal judges are usually more
experienced in handling the problems of multiparty actions.74 Third,
parties bringing an action in the federal courts will have the bene-
fit of the federal rules. For example, the pre-trial conference, which
could be useful in spurious class actions involving numerous par-
ties and complicated facts, is more widely used in federal courts
than in state courts.75 Fourth, some cases may involve ultimate
federal questions, although it may be impossible to comply with the
51 Nw. U.L. REV. 407, 409 (1956), for the view that local prejudice
against the nonresident litigant is still a valid argument for the continucd
existence of diversity jurisdiction.
71. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1942) (Frank-
furter J., dissenting). See also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 41 (1958), where Mr. Justice Brennan, in dissent,
said that "a distaste for the diversity jurisdiction" was a possible expla-
nation for the holding of the majority.
72. See Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1962), a non-class
action in which the court defended its allowance of intervention by non-
diverse parties against the argument that this extended the jurisdiction of
the federal courts in violation of FED. R. Civ. P. 82; accord, Heintz &
Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D.
Pa. 1962). But cf. Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell
& Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943) (Wyzanski, J.):
Additional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no
witnesses of their own, they are the source of additional questions, ob-
jections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend to make
the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair.
73. If the forum state does not provide for spurious class actions and
the federal court does, whether the federal court can allow the spurious
class actions in light of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), may
be questionable. However, it would seem in these situations that the federal
rule should apply. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525
(1958); Note, 46 MINN. L. REV. 913, 931-32 (1962).
74. Since federal statutes such as the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act have presented frequent occasions for
multiparty actions, federal judges have developed much expertise in han-
dling such problems of multiparty litigation as recognizing and providing for
the issues that must be tried separately.
75. See Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure, 14 F.R.D. 417, 422 (1953).
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requirements of federal question jurisdiction.7" In such cases, a
sympathetic fact-finder is useful to preserve federal policy, and
diversity jurisdiction provides plaintiff with the necessary federal
forum. Finally, despite the present criticism of diversity jurisdic-
tion, spurious class actions often present appropriate occasions
for its use. Federal courts may be necessary in class suits since
state courts probably cannot effectively resolve the problems pre-
sented by the large number of parties of diverse citizenship in such
suits. 77
Ill. PREJUDICE TO ORIGINAL PARTIES
- Although intervention by nondiverse parties in a particular spur-
ious class action may be justified by the res judicata effect of the
judgment or by the group-remedy function, a federal court must
consider whether such intervention "will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties",' before
granting permission to intervene. Examples of prejudice that a
defendant could suffer include the loss of a defense based on the
state statute of limitations, the inability to assert a permissive coun-
terclaim because it lacks independent jurisdictional grounds, and
the lack of mutuality of estoppel.
These problems of prejudice to original parties, however, will
not materially affect a court's determination of whether to allow
nondiverse parties to intervene in spurious class actions. Such
problems may be either resolved or outweighed by the importance
of intervention to the group-remedy function. For example, a
court could allow the defendant to assert the expiration of the
state statute of limitations against the intervenors79 or it could
76. See, e.g., American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908).
77. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 897 (1953). This is analogous to the interpleader area. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1335, 2361 (1958); cf. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 704 n.66.
It would seem that the spurious class suit is neither a class suit nor a
mere permissive joinder device. Rather, it is an attempt to provide a
remedy to dispose of a multiple party problem as efficiently as can be
done under present rules.
Simeone, supra note 39, at 923-24.
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
79. Courts have divided over the question of whether the state stat-
ute of limitations is to be applied in this situation. Compare Kam Koon
Wan v. E. E. Black Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553, 564-65 (D. Hawaii 1948), with
Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 985 (3d Cir. 1941). The Su-
preme Court, however, has held in a class action that where a plaintiff
was barred from bringing suit in the state court, the federal court was
bound to apply the state statute of limitations. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
19631
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regard the commencement of the class action as tolling the stat-
ute of limitations for all members of the class."0 While a per-
missive counterclaim may be barred for a lack of independent
jurisdictional grounds,8" the court may use its discretion to deny
intervention if the defendant will, in fact, be prejudiced." Mu-
tuality of estoppel is a consideration if absent members of a spuri-
ous class are not bound by an unfavorable decision, but may inter-
vene after a determination of liability to benefit from the fav-
orable decision. 3 The extent to which this prejudices the defend-
ant is not great, however, because even without intervention, ab-
sent members of the class are in effect given two days in court,"
for they may observe the defense presented in the spurious class
action before commencing their own action. Furthermore, the de-
cision of the court on the legal questions involved in a separate
action may accord with the decision in the spurious class action
under the doctrine of stare decisis8 5
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). "As to consequences that so intimately affect
recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow
State law." Id. at 110. In this case, the Supreme Court (lid not consider
the important function that the class suit serves as a group remedy, but
the circuit court pointed out that where absent members relied upon the
supposed "class" aspect of the spurious class suit, imposing the state
statute of limitations as a bar would turn the suit into a "trap" for these
absent members. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir.
1944). Logically, the same rule should apply to intervenors as well as
original parties in the class action. "Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, . . . an intervenor in an action or proceeding is, for all
intents and purposes, an original party." In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., 71
F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
80. This is the way the statute of limitations is treated in true and
hybrid class suits. See Developments 942. The difficulty of.distinguishing be-
tween different kinds of class suits suggests that the same rule with respect
to the statute of limitations, as with res judicata, should be applied uni-
formly to all three types of class suits. See text accompanying notes 34-35
supra.
81. See Green, Federal Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims, 48 NW. U.L.
REV. 271, 282 (1953).
82. Cf. Finck v. Gilman Bros. Co., 11 F.R.D. 198 (D. Conn. 1951).
83. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1962); Albrecht v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1942); First
Nat'l Bank v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 355, 132 S.E. 824, 826 (1926)(dissenting opinion); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11[3] (2d ed.
1948); Developments 936; cf. Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S.
38, rehearing denied, 208 U.S. 609 (1908). See also Developments in the Law
-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 862 (1952). The validity of the
principle of mutuality of estoppel has been criticized, however. See Cur-
rie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957). Moreover, problems arising from the lack of
mutuality of estoppel would be eliminated if courts would use an empirical
approach to the res iudicta e'f.ct of judgments in class actions.
84. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 713.
85. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11[3], at 3466 (2d ed.
NOTES
CONCLUSION
The application of the complete diversity requirement to per-
missive joinder and permissive intervention but not to intervention
in spurious class actions presents an anomaly. The common ex-
planation of this anomaly, that the spurious class action is a pro-
cedural device to circumvent the complete diversity requirement,"
is an oversimplification, for it does not explain why this require-
ment should be circumvented. This circumvention may, in fact,
be justified because an empirical approach to the problem of res
judicata in class actions or a consideration of the function of the
spurious class action as a group remedy warrants the application
of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Whether ancillary juris-
diction is based on the res judicata effect of the judgment or on
the group-remedy function of the spurious class suit, however, it
should logically extend to nondiverse persons as original parties
as well as intervenors.' As courts have relaxed the complete di-
1948); cf. Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953). Another
slight possibility of prejudice might exist if the district court allows inter-
vention and the appellate court decides to impose the limitation of com-
plete diversity and dismiss the entire proceeding. Existing principles do not
compel this result. The problem may be solved by reference to permissivejoinder since the status of intervenors is that of original parties. Mis-joinder of a party who is not an indispensable party is not a ground for
dismissal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21. Intervenors in a spurious class suit are
not indispensable parties since by definition this type of class action in-
volves merely "several" rights. Thus, if the intervention is held to be im-
proper, the claims of the intervenors can be dismissed with the court re-
taining jurisdiction over the original claims and parties. See Glover v.
McFaddin, 99 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1951), which involved several mo-
tions for intervention. The court allowed intervention for those with diversity,
but dismissed the claims of nondiverse parties. If such a suit might injure
the proper parties, however, the court may have to dismiss as to all par-
ties and grant a new trial to the diverse parties. See Dollar S.S. Lines,
Inc. v. Merz, 68 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1934).
Another factor that the court should consider before it grants interven-
tion is whether the forum state permits intervention in spurious class ac-
tions. If the state does not allow such intervention, granting intervention in
the federal court would bring a conflict between federal and state law
and contravene the principle of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and the outcome determinative test as set out in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The court must decide whether this dif-
ference in outcome outweights the advantages to be gained by allowing
intervention--especially those of effectuating a group remedy and of avoid-
ing multiple litigation-in a spurious class action. Cf. Note, Erie Doctrine
and Federal Rule 13(a), 46 MINN. L. REV. 913, 931-32 (1962).
86. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11[3] (2d ed. 1948).
87. Neither of these suggestions would really overburden the federal
courts, for they would only involve additional parties in an existing suit.
Moreover, they would prevent additional suits in the state courts and
thereby increase judicial economy. But see Campbell, Jurisdictional and
Venue Aspects of Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 7 U. PIrr. L.
1963]
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versity requirement for intervention in spurious class actions, and
even in non-class actions, they may begin to relax that requirement
with permissive joinder. Only in this way will the anomaly be
fully resolved.
REV. 1, 10-11 (1940); Petition for Certiorari, pp. 16-17, Black v. Amen,
355 U.S. 600 (1958).
620
